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1.1 Introduction
The idea of freedom often arises in economic, political and philosophical de-
bates. However, economic theorists have, as yet, paid little attention to for-
malizing the concept. It was not until the nineties that we began to see a grow-
ing number of theoretical works attempting to accomplish this task. Some of
the works published by Amartya Sen during the eighties were a determining
antecedent for this stream. Sen suggested that issues other than income or
wealth needed to be considered in order to evaluate individual and collective
welfare. In particular, according to Sen, the opportunities and capabilities
that allow an individual to function in society are a closer proxy of personal
well-being for the purposes of measuring collective welfare. (See, for example,
Sen [48, 49, 50, 51])
Sen’s concern posed the question of how to measure and evaluate the
freedom of choice that an individual enjoys in a given situation. Nowadays, it
is possible to find many theoretical works on the issue, but very few regarding
its potential applications. This chapter intends to provide the reader with
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an overview of the most prominent theoretical results on the topic, and with
some clues as to the possible applications in conflict resolution.2
1.2 Formal Setting
In almost every work that attempts to formalize the concept of freedom of
choice, the central object of analysis is that of an opportunity set :
Let X be a set of alternatives: X = {x, y, z, ...}, and let Z be the set of all
the possible subsets of X. We will denote the elements of Z by capital letters
A, B, C, ... Thus, any element of Z can be interpreted as an opportunity set.
An opportunity set is a set of mutually exclusive alternatives, from which the
decision maker chooses one.
An opportunity set admits of different interpretations: the typical budget
set we find in the consumer theory is, actually, an opportunity set: it is a
set of alternative baskets of goods available to the consumer. However, many
other interpretations are admissible: the political parties one can vote for in
the elections, the available brands of a certain product, the different careers
that a student can pursue, alternative production plans for an entrepreneur,
possible holiday destinations, or, from a more general point of view, the differ-
ent life plans that society offers the individual. Obviously, another particular
interpretation is that of the set of alternative solutions at a certain stage of
a conflict. Usually, the related works do not stick to a particular interpreta-
tion, and maintain the analysis at the most abstract level, in order to provide
theories that are as general as possible.
The opportunity set available to an individual can be seen as containing
the information of his freedom of choice. Thus, we are interested in comparing
different possible opportunity sets, in terms of the freedom of choice they
provide, in order to make judgments about individual freedom.
Formally, we are interested in a binary relation of ”freedom-of-choice-
preference”, º, defined on the elements of Z, whose interpretation is: ∀A,B ∈
Z, A º B means that opportunity set A offers at least as much freedom to the
decision maker as opportunity set B. Associated to º, the binary relations
of strict preference (Â) and indifference (∼) are interpreted in the usual way:
A Â B as ”set A offers strictly more freedom than B” and A ∼ B as ”sets A
and B offer the same degree of freedom”.3
Since the relation º over sets has to represent what we mean by freedom
of choice, the usual procedure is to impose on the binary relation axioms or
conditions that are coherent with simple, basic intuitive ideas of what freedom
2 Before going any further, I would like to refer to Barbera` et al. ([9], Sects. 1,2
and 4), where readers interested in the theoretical approach can find a much more
extensive and detailed survey than what fits the scope of this chapter.
3 For the sake of fluency I will refer to the strict preference with expressions such
as ”strictly better” or ”strictly preferred” and to the weak preference simply as
”better” or ”preferred”.
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of choice is or should be, and then, try to discover general criteria to rank all
the possible opportunity sets that are logically consistent with the imposed
axioms.
As will be discussed later, the quality of the basic alternatives is in many
cases highly relevant to the design of the axioms to be imposed. For that
reason, it is often assumed that the quality of the alternatives is given and
represented by means of another binary relation, R, that is defined on the
domain of the basic alternatives, X. Thus, ∀x, y ∈ X, xRy is interpreted
as ”alternative x is more desirable than alternative y”. Associated to R, the
relations of strict preference, P , and indifference, I, are defined and interpreted
in the usual way: xPy as ”x is strictly more desirable than alternative y”, and
xIy as ”x and y are indifferent”.4
In those cases in which the quality of the alternatives is considered for the
evaluation of freedom, the formal problem consists of axiomatically exporting
(or ”extending”) the information given by the basic preferences, in order to
compare sets of alternatives. In other words, the basic question is: from what
we know about R, what can be said about º?
1.3 Why is Freedom of Choice a Good Thing?
Generally speaking, the axioms to be imposed on the preferences over sets
may depend on the reasons why freedom of choice is assumed to be of value.
This question would require a deep philosophical discussion, harking back to
Aristotle.5 However, a very naive overview of some economically meaningful
views will be enough for the purposes of this chapter:
(i) The value of freedom an opportunity set offers lies in the utility that,
given the agent’s preferences over the basic alternatives, he6 is able to obtain
from the set. That is, a set A of alternatives is said to provide strictly with
more freedom than a set B, (A Â B), if, according to the basic preferences, the
maximal utility attainable in A is greater than the maximal utility attainable
in B. This is the so-called indirect utility approach. The classical model of
consumer theory applies this approach: a budget set A is considered to be
better if, and only if, the consumer prefers the best attainable basket in A to
the best attainable basket in B. What counts is the final choice, and not the
availability of any other option. Therefore, enlargements of opportunity sets
are only desirable as far as they provide better options that were previously
unavailable.
4 Sometimes we will refer to the preferences over the basic alternatives as the
”basic preferences”, in order to distinguish them from the preferences º, which
are defined over sets.
5 For recent references on the philosophical foundations of the value of freedom of
choice see, for example, Carter [17] or Kramer [31].
6 The gender of the generic decision maker has been determined at random by the
flip of a coin.
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It should be noted that, under this view, an individual that freely chooses
an alternative x from a large number of other options will be equally free
if he is obliged to choose x. For this reason, the indirect-utility approach is
somewhat unsatisfactory for authors concerned with a more global view of
the value of freedom of choice.
(ii) Sometimes there is a degree of uncertainty in the individual’s basic
preferences. In such a case, the decision maker would prefer larger opportunity
sets and the chance to postpone his final choice, simply as a way to prevent
changes in his preferences. Therefore, what matters to the agent is how far an
opportunity set allows him to maximize his final utility according to his future
and definite preferences, at the point as which he has to make his final choice.
This is the so-called ”Preference for Flexibility” approach, initially developed
by Koopmans [30] and Kreps [32].
(iii) The classical Smithian view defends the freedom to choose (for ex-
ample, the freedom to decide what to produce, how to produce, what to buy,
who to buy from, ...) as a means towards collective welfare; these being the
necessary conditions for the invisible hand to work well.
(iv) As pointed out in the introduction, Amartya Sen also brings in the
political aspect of freedom, as a necessary condition for economic development
in underdeveloped countries.
(v) A tradition grounded on Stuart Mill [34] sees the mere act of choosing
freely from alternative options as contributing to develop the faculties of the
individual. Sugden [57] and Jones and Sugden [26] are examples of more recent
theoretical works rooted in the Millian motivation.
(vi) Another libertarian tradition, well developed by Nozick [36], sees free-
dom as intrinsically valuable for an individual life to be considered meaningful.
That is, the mere fact of being able to choose and deciding one’s own way of
life is valuable, regardless of any other instrumental consideration.
There are other possible sources for the value of freedom of choice. In
some non cooperative games, for instance, the mere availability of additional
strategies, even if they are dominated, may give an advantage. However, the
approaches above are the most frequently mentioned in the related literature.
A possible taxonomy of them is the following: (vi) is non-consequentialist,
while (i) to (v) are consequentialist in the sense that the freedom provided by
a set is valuable as a means to achieve something. Among the consequentialist
motivations, (i) and (ii) are welfarist (what is to be achieved is the maximal
possible individual utility according to certain given preferences), while the
rest are non-welfarist. I will start with the non-welfarist interpretations, which
seem to be closer to the original motivation of the analysis of the value of free-
dom of choice. I will return later to the second interpretation (the preference
for flexibility approach).
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1.4 Non-welfarist Approaches
The clearest non-welfarist aspect of the evaluation of freedom of choice in a set
is the number of opportunities. It appears obvious that more opportunities
to choose from should be associated with more freedom of choice. Steiner
[56], Pattanaik and Xu [39, 41], Van Hees [59] or Romero-Medina [46] have
developed the purely quantitative aspect of freedom.
If the number of alternatives in X is finite, Pattanaik and Xu [39] follow
the axiomatic method in order to characterize the cardinalist rule to rank
opportunity sets. This rule simply counts the number of alternatives in an
opportunity set and declares a set to be better than another (in terms of
freedom) if it contains more opportunities. These are their axioms:
• Indifference Between No-Choice Situations (INCS): ∀x, y ∈ X, {x} ∼ {y}.
That is, any pair of situations where there is no freedom of choice at all
(there is only one alternative to be chosen) are indifferent in the pure sense
of freedom.
• Strict Monotonicity (SM): ∀x, y ∈ X, {x, y} Â {x}: If, starting from a
situation in which there is no choice, we add a new alternative to the
opportunity set, then the situation strictly improves in terms of freedom.
• Independence (IND): ∀A,B ∈ Z, ∀x ∈ X \ A ∪ B, A º B if and only
if A ∪ {x} º B ∪ {x}. That is, if, for whatever reason, an opportunity
set A provides more freedom of than another opportunity set B, then
the addition of a new alternative x to each of them should not affect
the freedom-ranking between A and B. (The reverse is stated too: If we
remove from a pair of sets an alternative shared by both of them, the
ranking between them is not affected).
What makes Pattanaik and Xu’s proposal theoretically powerful is pre-
cisely that such plausible axioms are sufficient to ensure that the only criterion
that satisfies them consists on, simply, counting the number of alternatives,
that is, the cardinalist rule.
Steiner [56], Van Hees [59] and Romero-Medina [46] propose measurements
of relative freedom that take into account both, what the agent can and cannot
choose. For example, if n is the number of options that an agent is free to
choose in a particular situation, and n∗ the number of options that are socially
feasible, but not available to the agent, Steiner [56] proposes an index of
individual freedom given by nn+n∗ .
An important problem of the quantitative rules is that they are not ap-
plicable when we admit the possibility of infinite options in opportunity sets.
This is a very significant drawback in economic environments, since, for ex-
ample, the classical budget sets in the consumer theory are a continuum of
baskets: counting the number of alternatives is a very obvious way of address-
ing the size of a finite set, but, what is to be done if we are dealing with
infinite sets?
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Pattanaik and Xu [41] tackle this question by proposing (and axiomati-
cally characterizing) another rule that calculates the ”volume” of (possibly
infinite) sets. The cardinalist rule established that enlarging the sets with
more alternatives leads to an improvement in terms of freedom. Analogously,
the rule based on the volume of the set responds to the intuitive idea that if
a set (even if it is infinite, for example, a given budget set) is enlarged (for
example, by increasing the consumer’s income), then the agent enjoys more
freedom of choice.
Some authors are critical of the purely cardinalist view. They find an
objection to axioms such as (INCS): it is plausible, for example, that being
restricted to reading only one newspaper in one’s own language should be
viewed as a freer situation than being restricted to reading a newspaper in an
unknown language.
Jones and Sugden [26] take into account the qualitative aspect of the
alternatives in order to evaluate freedom by introducing the idea of reasonable
preferences: those preferences over the set of options that are ”reasonably
admissible”, that is, the set of preferences S that a reasonable person might
exhibit when placed in the position of the agent whose freedom we want to
evaluate. For example, for the opportunity set {pork for dinner, chicken for
dinner} it might be accepted as reasonable for somebody to prefer pork to
chicken (P P C), but also for his preferences to be the reverse (C P P),
and even to display indifference (C I P); unless we were in the position of
an orthodox muslim, in which case the set of reasonable preferences would
contain only C P P.
Jones and Sugden [26] define what they call a significant option in relation
to any given opportunity set. Let any opportunity set A ∈ Z, and let x be an
element of A, then x is said to be significant in A if there exists at least one
ordering R of the alternatives which is reasonable and for which x is the only
best alternative in A. In other words, x is a significant option in A if we can
imagine a reasonable person choosing x from A as the only best option.
Then, they introduce three axioms:
• (INCS) (the same axiom as in Pattanaik and Xu [39])
• Principle of Addition of Significant Options, which establishes that if, to
any opportunity set A, we add a new option x, which is significant in the
enlarged set A∪{x}, then there is a strict improvement in terms of freedom
(A Â A ∪ {x}).
• Principle of Addition of Insignificant Options, which establishes that if,
to any opportunity set A, we add a new option x, which is not significant
in the enlarged set A ∪ {x}, then the degree of freedom does not change
(A ∼ A ∪ {x}).
Jones and Sugden [26] obtain a negative result: if there exists at least one
pair x, y in the universe of alternatives such that every reasonable person
would strictly prefer x to y, then it is impossible to find a complete ranking
of all the possible opportunity sets that satisfies the three axioms.
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Pattanaik and Xu [40] take the notion of reasonable preferences to re-
formulate their cardinalist rule. What they propose, and axiomatically char-
acterize, is a rule based on counting only the significant options. In a later
article, Pattanaik and Xu [41] adapt this rule to economic environments, in
which opportunity sets can be infinite.
Foster [20] proposes a different interpretation for the set of preferences
S. S can be also viewed as the set of the true preference orderings that the
individuals in the society have. This interpretation requires for the social agent
that evaluates individual freedom a larger amount of information than what
is necessary to set up the reasonable-preferences model: in the latter case, it
is enough to have a subjective idea of what is reasonable, while in the former,
the actual preferences of all need to be known.
Foster investigates what he calls the Unanimity Relation over opportunity
sets, ºN , which is defined in the following way: set A offers more freedom
than set B (A ºN B) if, for each agent in society, his best available option in
A (according to his actual preferences) is better than his best available option
in B. In the words of the standard utility theory, A ºN B if everybody attains
a greater indirect utility in A than in B.
Clearly ºN is a partial ordering: Imagine that there exists one person in
society that strictly prefers chicken for dinner rather than pork, and another
that strictly prefers pork to chicken. This circumstance is enough to declare
the opportunity sets {pork} and {chicken} incomparable with respect to the
unanimity relation. To solve the problem of incompleteness of the relation,
Foster [20] also proposes a complete ranking, based on the number of alterna-
tives in X that a set dominates in terms of the unanimity relation. However,
he does not provide axiomatic characterization of such a rule.
Following the criticism of the purely quantitative approach, we find an-
other group of works that could be labeled as individual-centered. The rules
shown in the previous pages take the position of a social planner who wishes
to evaluate the freedom enjoyed by any anonymous individual in society. The
rules we are now going to describe try to consider the freedom enjoyed by
a given individual, taken for granted some information about his particular
preferences. The hypothesis again is that individual well-being is not totally
captured by the indirect utility, and that the possibility to choose other alter-
natives is intrinsically desirable. Thus, these works try to evaluate the overall
well-being that opportunity sets provide to a given individual, considering not
only the quality, but also the quality of the alternatives.
The cardinalist rule by Pattanaik and Xu [39] can be seen as a polar case
that considers only the quantity of the alternatives, regardless of their quality.
At the other pole, we have the indirect utility criterion, that looks only at their
quality (actually it looks only at the quality of one alternative; the best).
Bossert et al. [15] characterize axiomatically some rules that come between
the two polar cases: We will mention one that is especially interesting; the
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leximax ranking of opportunity sets.7 According to this criterion, in order to
compare any pair of sets A and B, we first look at the best alternative in each
set (with respect to the decision maker’s preferences). If the best alternative in
A is strictly better than that in B, then the rule declares A as strictly preferred
to B. If the two best alternatives are indifferent, then the rule compares the
sets by comparing the second best alternative in each set, and so on, until
the ties are broken. It may, in the process, turn out that in one set there is
an element to compare, while in the other they are exhausted. In such a case,
the leximax declares the former to be strictly preferred.
As a clarifying example, consider a universe X of three alternatives X =
{x, y, z}, and consider an agent that strictly prefers x to y and y to z (xPyPz).
Then the possible opportunity sets would be ordered by the leximax in the
following way: {x, y, z} Â {x, y} Â {x, z} Â {x} Â {y, z} Â {y} Â {z}.
The leximax rule proposes an interesting compromise between the instru-
mental value of freedom of choice on the one hand (when there is no tie in
the respective first-best alternatives, the leximax collapses into the indirect
utility criterion), and the intrinsic value of freedom of choice on the other
(any enlargement of a set leads to a strict improvement in terms of freedom).
However, the leximax rule as defined above is also inapplicable if infinite op-
portunity sets are admitted. For extensions of the leximax criterion to the
infinite case, see Arlegi et al. [1] and Ballester et al. [8]
Other works that also consider the role of individual preferences reach
impossibility results. According to them, it is impossible under certain axioms
to find a ranking of opportunity sets that serve as a compromise between
the quantitative and the qualitative aspect of the opportunity sets (see for
example Gravel [23], Puppe [44], or Dutta and Sen [19]). Other interesting
related references are Puppe [45] and Bossert [13].
1.5 The Preference for Flexibility Approach
Suppose a two-stage decision-making context: At stage t the decision-maker is
given a certain opportunity set, while in t+1 he has to make the final choice
of one alternative from the set. Suppose also that, at stage t, the decision-
maker is not totally sure what his preferences will be at stage t + 1. In such
circumstances, it is natural to assume that, at stage t, the decision maker will
prefer to maintain bigger opportunity sets, as a way of preventing changes in
his future preferences or adapting to future contingencies. That is, from this
point of view, it is also the case that, if a set A includes another set B, then
A º B.
Notice that, in this case, the reason why the decision-maker prefers larger
opportunity sets is purely instrumental: the desire for more options is no more
7 For the formal definition of the leximax ranking and other rules see Bossert et al.
[15].
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than a way of ensuring a maximal indirect utility in the future, when the final
choice has to be made. When the desire for larger opportunity sets is of this
kind, the agent is usually said to display ”preference for flexibility”
Koopmans [30] discusses this problem in a seminal work, and some years
later Kreps [32] develops it further. According to Kreps [32], two necessary
conditions for a ranking of sets to exhibit preference for flexibility are the
following:
• For any pair of sets A, B, if A includes B (B ⊆ A), then A º B (K1).
As said before, an enlargement of an opportunity set can never reduce the
flexibility of choice.
• For any three sets A, B and C, if A ∼ A ∪ B, then A ∪ C ∼ A ∪ B ∪ C
(K2). That is, if, for whatever reason the addition of the alternatives in
B does not add any flexibility to A, then, the addition of B should neither
add flexibility to a set that is bigger than A.
The main result in Kreps [32] is one of representation: an ordering of
opportunity sets satisfies those two axioms if and only if we can find a set
of contingent utility functions defined on X such that, in order to evaluate
opportunity sets, the decision maker maximizes the summation of all the
different maximal utilities he would be able to reach with the elements of
the sets under the different possible states of the world. Then, if (K1) and
(K2) are satisfied, we can interpret that, to evaluate an opportunity set, the
decision maker behaves as if he were adding up the different maximal utilities
he could reach with the elements of the set for each possible state of the world
(possible state of his future preferences).
Arlegi and Nieto [4] also explore the concept of flexibility from a differ-
ent point of view. They assume that agents may at present be absolutely sure
about some parts of their future preferences, while being uncertain about oth-
ers. This is reflected by a partial ordering on the basic alternatives. The deci-
sion maker admits at the current stage that his preferences may be completed
at the second stage. Under this formulation, and imposing certain axioms, it
is shown how, depending on the ”size” of the partial ordering, it generates
different orderings over opportunity sets. At one extreme, if the agent is not
at all sure of any of his preferences (that is, at stage t, the relation of prefer-
ences is empty), then the ranking over sets is always strictly monotonic (any
enlargement of any opportunity set leads to a strict improvement in terms
of freedom). At the other extreme, if the agent is totally sure of all of his
future preferences (formally, they are a linear ordering), then the final rank-
ing over sets collapses into the indirect utility ranking. The last result reveals
that, under the preference for flexibility assumption, uncertainty is the only
motivation for wanting more possibilities to choose from. In a later work, Ar-
legi and Nieto [5] propose some additional axioms and conditions of the basic
preferences, leading precisely to the cardinalist rule and the leximax.
The message of the two works by Arlegi and Nieto ([4, 5]) is sceptical to-
wards the scope of the results shown in Sect. 4: some of the most paradigmatic
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rules that have been characterized as displaying the intrinsic value of freedom
of choice (such as the cardinalist rule, the leximax or, in general, all rankings
that are strictly monotonic) can be plausibly obtained under a purely welfarist
approach, if we assume uncertainty over the future preferences.
1.6 The Value of Diversity
Diversity can be considered as a desirable property for a set of options. Several
works have analyzed the value of an opportunity set in terms of the diver-
sity of the options it contains. For some authors, the ideas of diversity and
freedom overlap. For others there are important differences. In any case, the
measurement and evaluation of diversity has many analogies with the mea-
surement and evaluation of freedom of choice. Indeed, the problem is usually
approached with a similar axiomatic methodology. In this case, it is not the
quality of the basic alternatives that matters, but rather their similarity. This
can be described by means of a binary relation of similarity, or, alternatively,
by some kind of measurement of the distance between the alternatives. On the
basis of this information, axioms are imposed over opportunity sets based on
simple, intuitive ideas about what is meant by offering more (or less) diversity.
As we have shown, (INCS) and (SM) are two axioms of the cardinalist
rule that are susceptible to criticism when we want to introduce the role of
preferences in the evaluation of sets. The third axiom in the characterization,
(IND), turns out to be problematic when considering the diversity aspect of
sets: even if a set A is better than B, the addition of a new alternative x to
both sets may contribute greatly to the diversity in B while in no way affecting
the diversity in A and, may even bring about the reversal of the previous
preference between A and B. For example, it is plausible to assume that the
menu {chicken, pork} is more diverse than the menu {potatoes from Southern
France, potatoes from Northern Spain}, but also that the menu {chicken, pork,
beef } offers less diversity than {potatoes from Southern France, potatoes from
Northern Spain, beef }, especially for someone who does not like meat.
The problem of the measurement of diversity has already been approached
by biologists from the fifties, as a way of evaluating the biodiversity offered by
an ecosystem (see the seminal works by Shannon [54], Good [22], and more
recent developments by Baczkowski et al. [6, 7] and Magurran [33]). How-
ever, there are few works that approach the question of diversity in economic
contexts. I will just give a brief overview of the most prominent ones:
Marlies Ahlert (Klemisch-Ahlert [27]) proposes the size of the convex hull
of an opportunity set as a proxy of its degree of diversity. Then, an oppor-
tunity set A is better (in terms of diversity) than another set B, if B can be
transformed and shifted in such a way that its convex hull is contained by
A’s convex hull.8 One of the problems of Ahlert’s proposal is that it is only a
partial ordering, making impossible the comparison of many pairs of sets.
8 For a related approach see Rosenbaum [47].
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Pattanaik and Xu [42] establish a similarity relation over the set of basic
alternatives, and propose the following rule for comparing any two sets. For
both sets, seek the minimum number of subsets into which they can be split
such that all elements within each subset are similar. Then, the set with
the larger minimum number of such subsets is declared better. The intuition
underlying the rule is that if a set cannot be split into more sets, it means that
all alternatives in the set are similar. At the other extreme, if a set can be split
into as many subsets as alternatives, and we cannot find any other separation
in which there are two alternatives, it means that all the alternatives are
dissimilar two-by-two.9
There is another group of economists who propose axiomatic models for
the measurement of diversity taking as a primitive a numerical measure of the
distance between the alternatives. Examples of this approach are Weitzman
[61, 62, 63], who analyzes the particular case of biodiversity; or Bossert et al.
[16] and Nehring and Puppe [35] in an economic framework. However, one of
the drawbacks of this approach is that it is usually based on a cardinal notion
of diversity. Then, to what extent can we make statements like “potatoes
from Southern France and potatoes from Northern Spain are three times more
similar than chicken and pork”? Actually, Van Hees [60] shows that, under
certain axioms, it is impossible to obtain a ranking of sets made in terms of
diversity on the basis of a measure of the distance between alternatives.
1.7 The Distributive Aspect: Equality of Opportunities
As happens with the notion of freedom, the idea of equality of opportunities is
often acclaimed in political and economic debates, and also when the solution
of a conflict is at stake. The models shown in the previous sections are in-
tended to measure and evaluate individual freedom by looking at the decision
maker’s opportunity set. In a collective framework, the notion of equality of
opportunities can be approached by analyzing how opportunity sets are allo-
cated among agents. This is the approach taken by Kranich [28, 29], Herrero
[24], Ok [37], Herrero et al. [25], Kranich and Ok [38] Bossert et al. [14], and
Arlegi and Nieto [3] among others.
In this context, the formal object of analysis is that of an opportunity
profile: vectors of opportunity sets, one set for each agent in society. Then,
opportunity profiles represent how opportunities are distributed. Many of the
related works start with the simplest case of two individuals. In such a case, an
opportunity profile takes the form [A1, A2], where A1 represents the opportu-
nity set of individual 1 and A2 that of individual 2. Then, axioms are imposed
9 For other approaches based on a primitive binary relation of similarity see Bavetta
and Del Seta [10], and Peragine and Romero-Medina [43]. See also Bervoets and
Gravel [12] for an approach based on a more refined relation of similarity between
pairs of alternatives.
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on a binary relation of preferences (º∗) defined over the space of opportunity
profiles Z × Z. Thus, [A1, A2] º∗ [B1, B2] is interpreted as ”situation A (in
which agent 1 enjoys opportunity set A1 and agent 2 opportunity set A2) is
a more egalitarian distribution of opportunities than situation B (in which
agent 1 enjoys the opportunity set B1 and agent 2 opportunity set B2)”.10
In this framework, we can find axiomatic characterization of two rules,
each capturing, from a different point of view, the degree of equality in the
distribution of opportunities:
• The cardinality-difference ranking (Kranich [28]), which minimizes the dif-
ference in the number of opportunities between the two agents. Formally,
∀ [A1, A2] , [B1, B2] ∈ Z × Z, [A1, A2] º∗ [B1, B2] if | #A1 − #A2 |≤|
#B1 −#B2 |.
• The number of common opportunities ranking (Herrero et al. [25] and
Bossert et al. [14]), which maximizes the number of opportunities shared
by both agents: ∀ [A1, A2] , [B1, B2] ∈ Z×Z, [A1, A2] º∗ [B1, B2] if #(A1∩
A2) ≥ #(B1 ∩#B2).
It is not difficult to find examples to show that each of the above rules
can lead to counterintuitive judgments in certain situations when taken sepa-
rately. In Arlegi and Nieto [3] such examples are given to justify the wisdom
of applying rules that combine the two criteria. Thus, two rules which are
lexicographic combinations of the cardinality-difference ranking and the num-
ber of common opportunities ranking are characterized. The first rule begins
by considering the difference in the number of opportunities, and only if two
social situations (opportunity profiles) have the same difference in opportu-
nities, does it take into account the number of common opportunities. The
second rule is the dual version of the latter. We look first at the number of
common opportunities, and only if this number is equal, do we consider the
difference in the cardinality. Furthermore, Arlegi and Nieto [3] propose some
extensions to the n-agents case and show that, under certain axioms, the only
admissible combinations of the above rules are lexicographic combinations.
Other related approaches are Kranich and Ok [38], where an analogy is
made between the measurement of income inequality and the measurement of
inequality of opportunities, and Ok [37], where the measurement of inequality
is not based merely on “counting” alternatives.
1.8 Other Approaches
The opportunity set enjoyed by an agent seems to contain most of the infor-
mation relevant to evaluating his freedom: e.g. the number of opportunities
10 We denote the relation of preference over profiles with “*” in order to distinguish
it from the relation º, defined over individual opportunity sets, studied in the
previous sections.
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and what they are. However, in many contexts there are circumstances that
may be relevant for the evaluation of freedom of choice, but that cannot be
captured by a bare description of the elements of the set.
The theories shown in the preceding pages are rather deterministic: the
decision-maker has full power to choose an alternative from his opportunity
set, and this choice perfectly determines the consequences with total certainty.
Nevertheless, things tend to be more complex in the real world. Individuals
interact, and the consequences of the actions of one are often conditioned on
the actions and strategies taken by others. This raises the question of how to
define the opportunity set of a player in a given game.
Pattanaik proposes a model in which each basic alternative (strategy) is
identified by its corresponding set of possible outcomes (which depend on
the other player’s strategies). Each such set of outcomes is usually called a
prospect. Therefore, the decision maker does not compare opportunity sets,
but vectors of prospects. Under this point of view, Pattanaik characterizes a
rule that compares such vectors of prospects by looking at the number of the
available strategies, regardless of the final outcomes.11
Other authors have followed a phenomenological approach. For example,
Suppes [58] uses statistical information to apply a certain entropy index in or-
der to measure freedom in some paradigmatic contexts. One of those contexts
is that of competition in an industry. Suppes applies his index to measure dis-
persion in supply: the number of enterprises their relative size. Consequently,
the index score measures freedom of competition in the industry. Another
context in which Suppes applies his index is that of political elections. In an
analogous way, the index can measure the dispersion in votes cast for the dif-
ferent parties. Then, according to Suppes, an excessive concentration of votes
a limited number of parties would be a symptom of lack of political freedom.12
Experimentation is another alternative approach with great potential. To
the best of my knowledge Sonsino and Mandelbaum [55] is the only reference
that, in the context of ranking opportunity sets, explores the experimental
method. These authors’ experiments are designed to evaluate the individual
preference for flexibility (in the presence of uncertainty), rather than the indi-
vidual value of freedom of choice. Presumably, experiments might be designed
in such a way as to provide clues about whether freedom of choice has a purely
intrinsic value or not; on what this intrinsic value depends, and so on. However,
in order to check for and isolate the intrinsic value of freedom, uncertainty
should be ruled out of the decision problem designed for the experiment.
In certain situations, in order to make judgments about individual free-
dom, it may be more important to know which things the agent cannot do,
11 This model was proposed by Professor Pattanaik at his Plenary Conference for
the Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare,
Pasadena, Ca, USA, July 2002. To the best of my knowledge there is not even a
mimeographed copy of it.
12 See also D’Agostino et al. [18] for a more recent analysis of freedom in economi-
cally meaningful contexts, which is based on statistical observations.
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than which he can. And even more important, the reasons why an agent may
be unable to choose certain options. This idea leads to the notion of nega-
tive freedom; what the agent cannot do, due to the encroachment by others.
Barbera` et al. [9] propose the following example: It may be relevant to know
whether a person can or cannot choose to be a football player in his life, but it
may be more relevant for the purpose of evaluating freedom to know whether
he is unable to be a football player because of some physical handicap or
because he is black and the local law prevents blacks from playing football.
The concept of negative freedom was studied by Berlin in [11]. From a more
theoretical point of view, things that the agent cannot do can easily be incor-
porated into the model (remember, for example, Steiner’s index of freedom
based on the relative number of available options (Steiner [56])). It is less easy,
however, to model the reasons why certain options are not available. And even
more complicated is the task of determining the boundaries of the notion of
“encroachment by others” in societies as complex as ours. For research on the
notion of negative freedom and its formalization, the reader may consult Van
Hees [60].
Negative freedom can be considered as a particular case of an external
reference associated to the opportunity set. That is, a circumstance associated
to the choice from the opportunity set, that cannot be represented by means
of the set, and that is of relevance in order to evaluate how free the choice is.
In the case of negative freedom such a “circumstance” might be described by
the enumeration of the options that are not available to the decision makers
because of the encroachment by others. However, it is possible to imagine
other kinds of external references such as the following:
(i) The procedure that generates the alternatives in the set. For example,
Gaertner and Xu [21] stress the technological aspect. Many people would be
willing to shrink their budget set in order to avoid consuming goods produced
in ”unfair” conditions, such as the exploitation of children in underdeveloped
countries, or highly contaminating technologies. In the case of conflict reso-
lution, we could think of different procedures used by the mediators to make
the different alternatives available to the parties. From a more general point
of view, one might be interested in considering the ethical desirability of a
political system that facilitated a particular set of alternative life plans.
(ii) The way preferences over the alternatives have been formed. For exam-
ple, in order to evaluate the freedom to choose a government in the elections,
apart from the availability of different political options, it might be relevant
to consider whether individuals have well-informed preferences or are to some
extent coerced, manipulated or persuaded. The same is applicable for the
choice of alternative ways to proceed in a conflictive situation.
(iii) The distributive aspect of freedom. Even from the individual point of
view, one’s feeling of freedom to choose may depend on whether or not others
are also free to do so.
(iii) The procedure for making the final choice. The mere act of choosing
might involve more or less freedom depending on certain procedural aspects,
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such as bureaucratic barriers, the degree of anonymity in the choice (for ex-
ample whether voting is secret or not), and others.
(iv) The degree of reversibility in the final choice: For example, the choice
of who to marry might be considered more or less free according to whether
or not divorce is possible.
Arlegi and Dimitrov [2] propose a model to evaluate the freedom offered by
an opportunity set when there is some external reference to be taken into ac-
count. In their model, the object of axiomatic analysis are ”procedure-based”
opportunity sets, consisting of a set of opportunities together with the infor-
mation about the form that the associated external reference takes.
1.9 Applications for Conflict Resolution
Conflicts involve situations and processes in which many of the central ques-
tions of the models above often arise. For example, negotiating parties tend
to evaluate the freedom to choose different ways during the process of negoti-
ation and resolution, but the final solution of a conflict can also be analyzed
from the point of view of the freedom it offers to the different agents in the
conflict.
In any case, when analyzing conflicts and possible solutions, there are many
questions for which a mediator or facilitator may like to find an answer. For
example, how free are the parties at any moment? Why do they want freedom?
Is it an intrinsic desire of freedom or is it purely instrumental? If it is purely
instrumental, can the problem be simplified by reducing uncertainties? Do
parties enjoy diversity in the set of possible solutions or in the opportunity set
that the final solution offers them? Do the process of resolution and the final
solution ensure equality of opportunities to everybody at any given point of
time? To what extent? Do certain vetoes in the process impose a significant
degree of negative freedom? Are there procedural aspects in the process of
resolution that may affect the agent’s freedom of choice? This is the kind
of questions for which the works surveyed in the previous sections provide
theoretically powerful tools.
Furthermore, the question of freedom could be evaluated from the point
of view of the freedom enjoyed by the mediator. He might like to evaluate
his own degree of freedom to seek possible solutions to a particular conflict.
This could allow him to catalogue conflicts, in order to make a more informed
choice of appropriate strategy and way to proceed.
Briefly, therefore, there is in my opinion a huge territory to be explored
with respect to the application of freedom of choice (and related) models for
the resolution of conflicts. In the following paragraphs I will mention just a
few potential lines of research. All of them take for granted that a formal
description of the conflict is well specified:
(i) The solution to some conflicts consists of a particular distribution of
payoffs. However, in many other conflicts the solution may call for a more
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complex distribution of rights, commitments, payoffs, etc. This might be the
case for regional conflicts, where the issue what is at stake involves the rights
to use certain natural resources, or cultural conflicts in which the question is
how to ensure the right of different communities to develop their own culture.
A particular endowment of rights can be represented by means of a set of
opportunities. Then, in such a context, an impartial mediator might be inter-
ested in comparing the degree of equality between the opportunities offered
by alternative solutions. Different criteria of equality of opportunities, such as
those mentioned in Sect. 7, provide some clues with respect to the theoretical
possibilities. Since all those works follow an axiomatic methodology, one can
consider which axioms can most plausibly be assumed to tackle the particular
situation, and accordingly, determine the most appropriate rule for evaluating
equality in the distribution of opportunities.
(ii) The very process of negotiation and mediation in conflicts can some-
times be interpreted as a succession of decisions over opportunity sets that
shrinks progressively in successive steps. That is, at the starting point, the
universe of possible solutions might be large, but, as the process advances,
the parties or the mediator, reject some potential solutions as being inadmis-
sible. In such a case, the mediator may find it desirable, not only that the
final solution, if reached, be fair, but also that all the intermediate steps in
the process should allow the different agents sufficient freedom to continue
making choices.
(iii) The mediator may consider his own problem as one of choosing from
an opportunity set of alternative solutions or ways to proceed. Then the rea-
sonable preferences approach (see Sect. 4) could be applied, in order to restrict
in the initial stages the set of possible solutions and simplify the problem of
the mediator: it might be the case that the mediator lacks information about
the individual preferences of the parties. However, let us assume that he is
able to establish, for each party, its set of reasonable preferences regarding the
potential solutions. In such a case, we could take Jones and Sugden’s approach
[26]: all those solutions that, under no reasonable preferences, are preferred by
any of the parties could be deleted, thus simplifying the mediator’s problem.
Note, however, that this way of simplifying the problem may involve draw-
backs from the point of view of fairness: imagine two parties, P1 and P2,
and three possible solutions a, b, c. Imagine, further, that the set of reasonable
preferences for A are aPbPc and aPcPb,13 while, from the objective point of
view of P2, the only reasonable preferences are bPcPa. Then, since there is no
reasonable situation in which c is the best option for any of the candidates, c
should be ignored as a candidate for a solution. Thus, a and b remain. Let us
now imagine that the resolution of the conflict develops in such a way that the
final solution is b. Suppose, however, that, if no alternative were ruled out in
the first step, the conflict might develop in such a way that the final solution
13 We will assume, for the sake of simplicity, transitivity of the preferences.
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were c. Clearly, if P1’s truel preferences are aPcPb, he has good reason to
protest the elimination of alternative c in the first step.
(iv) In another possible scenario the mediator might know the actual pref-
erences of the parties about the possible solutions. In such a case, application
of Foster’s [20] unanimity relation would be appropriate. This case is sim-
pler, but the problem just mentioned in the reasonable preferences example
is not avoided: If P1’s actual preferences are aPbPc and P2’s actual prefer-
ences are bPcPa, then c is unanimously dominated for everybody and could
be ignored. It could be the case, however, that, once c is ignored, the final
solution turns out to be a. If, when all three alternatives are considered there
were some chance that the conflict might develop in such a way that c were
reached, then, P2 may clearly denounce the unfairness of the simplification
in the first-step.14
(v) Very often, the objective of the conflict resolution is the signing of
an agreement or a contract, in which the different parties establish their
rights and obligations; agreeing to compensate each other in the event of
non-fulfillment. At this point, Pattanaik’s prospect-based model (See Sect. 8)
might be useful. According to Pattanaik, individuals choose among sets of
prospects, where each prospect is a set of possible outcomes contingent upon
the strategies of other agents. Therefore, a contract can be interpreted as a
specific way to determine the game to be played by the parties. From this
point of view, a contract establishes for each party a set of admissible strate-
gies, the results of which will depend on the strategies adopted by the other
parties.
Then, the solution of the conflict may consist of choosing the appropriate
model for the contract that is to be signed. If this is the case, it would be
relevant to know how the agents evaluate the different alternative models of
contracts, each consisting, formally, of a particular specification of the avail-
able vector of prospects. Therefore, it might be of great use to have a good
set of theoretically-grounded rules fro comparing vectors of prospects.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, when looking for a suitable
contract, each party tries, on the one hand, to secure the chance to take some
decisions. In this sense, agents display a preference for as much flexibility
as possible in contracts, that is, contracts which offer a set of admissible
strategies as large as possible. On the other hand, each party would also
like to specify the contract in such a way as to avoid undesirable results
deriving from the use of certain strategies by the other party. That is, there
is an incentive to reduce the freedom provided by the contract. Nevertheless,
making the contracts more specific, typically, limits one’s own strategies. Thus,
a trade-off arises between the desire of flexible contracts and the preference
for restricted contracts. Again, the axiomatic analysis of rules for comparing
14 In all the examples we are assuming the existence of an algorithm or mechanism
for conflict resolution that selects an alternative, and that such a mechanism may
be affected by the expansion of the initial set of alternatives.
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vectors of prospects becomes a convenient tool for making explicit positive
and normative principles for solving such trade-offs.
(vi) In the previous sections we also mentioned the procedural aspect of
freedom. The mere specification of the individual sets of opportunities may not
be enough to capture all the aspects needed to evaluate freedom of choice (see
Sect. 8). The techniques for conflict resolution typically feature an important
procedural aspect. For example, in a territorial conflict, the same agreement
might be perceived in different ways by the agents according to where the
agreement is signed (on home, on foreign territory or on neutral ground), or
the person who signs it (his political relevance, for example). Thus, following
Arlegi and Dimitrov’s model (Sect. 8), it may be useful to describe all the
potential states of the conflict by means of procedure-based opportunity sets,
in which not only the set of opportunities is described, but also the particular
state of the external reference.
(vii) As a general consideration, a message of all the freedom of choice
literature is that individual well-being consists (or may consist) of something
other than the bare consequences of individual actions. For example, individ-
uals may value the mere fact of having autonomy to determine the way of
things. From the normative point of view also, there appear to be reasons to
agree on the ethical value of autonomous choice. This is something worthy of
consideration by mediators. Many proposals for conflict resolution consist of
algorithms and automats which are black boxes offering an output (solution
to the conflict) in exchange for certain inputs (the relevant elements of the
conflict). Such mechanisms have well-known advantages; among others, they
tend to prevent agents from manipulating the process. However, it should also
be considered how such mechanisms affect individual freedom of choice and
consequently collective well-being.
1.10 Conclusions and Final Remarks
It is possible that the reader who expected concrete models for solving con-
flicts is frustrated by this point in the chapter. Unfortunately there are no
specific applications of theoretical models of freedom of choice to the resolu-
tion of conflicts. However, I believe in the potential of such a line of research.
Through the preceding pages, I have aimed to bring to the knowledge of all
researchers interested in conflict resolution the existence of the surveyed field
of literature. Needless to say, the survey does not claim to be exhaustive. It is
actually quite superficial. I think, however, that the references provided will
allow interested readers to search more deeply into the subject. I have made
some rough indications for potential applications. They are based on quite
simple intuition, and are perhaps not the lines of research with the greatest
potential. Experts on conflict resolution may find other much more obvious
and promising lines of application, in which case this chapter will have satis-
factorily fulfilled its goal.
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This work was conceived while I was participating in the project Procedural
Approaches to Conflict Resolution, coordinated, among others, by Professor
Matthias Raith. One of the principal leitmotivs of the project was interdisci-
plinarity. Interdisciplinarity, on the one hand, as a way towards a better and
richer understanding of the problems, and on the other hand, as a network of
bridges to cross the barriers nowadays imposed by the extreme specialization
in research. I only hope that this chapter may be in some way useful, as far
as conflict resolution is concerned, in helping to construct such a network.
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